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Moldea v. New York Times Co.,
22 F.3D 310 (D.C. Cm. 1994).
INTRODUCTION
Dan E. Moldea ("Moldea"), an investigative journalist, sued the New York
Times Company ("Times") for defamation and false light invasion of privacy
when it published a highly critical review of Moldea's book in the New York
Times Book Review. The United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia ruled that the Times' review was not defamatory because it contained only
unverifiable statements of the reviewer's opinion of Moldea's book, or of state-
ments that no reasonable juror could find to be false. The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, in Moldea (I),' holding
that the trial court erred in ruling that the Times' review could not be defamatory
as a matter of law, because some of the challenged characterizations of the book
were sufficiently factual that a jury could determine their truth or falsity. Upon
consideration of the Times' petition for rehearing, the Court of Appeals conceded
that it had applied an inappropriate standard in Moldea (I) and amended its earli-
er decision, subsequently holding that the challenged statements were supportable
interpretations of Moldea's book and that, as a matter of law, the review was
substantially true. Based upon this new analysis, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the District Court's grant of summary judgment on behalf of the Times.
FACTS
Plaintiff, Moldea, is an investigative journalist who specializes in stories about
organized crime. His most recent book, Interference: How Organized Crime
Influences Professional Football, published in 1989, was the subject of this suit.
Defendant, Times, published a highly unfavorable review of Interference in the
September 3, 1989 edition of the New York Times Book Review, written by Ger-
ald Eskenazi, a sportswriter for the Times.
Moldea filed a defamation suit against the Times, alleging that the Times'
review destroyed public interest in his book and effectively ended his career as
an investigative journalist. Moldea's complaint alleged that six specific state-
ments in the review were defamatory in that they accused Moldea of being an
incompetent investigative journalist. The district court examined at length only
one of the disputed statements: "But there is too much sloppy journalism to trust
the bulk of this book's 512 pages-including its whopping 64 pages of notes."2
The district court found that challenged portions of the Times' review con-
sisted only of statements of non-verifiable opinion about a literary work, or were
1. Moldea v. New York Times Co., 15 F.3d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
2. Moldea (I), 15 F.3d at 1141.
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so clearly true that no reasonable juror could find them false. In granting the
Times' motion for summary judgment, the trial court ruled that Moldea's claim
was not actionable as a matter of law. The plaintiff appealed.
On appeal, the appellate court reversed, holding that some of the challenged
characterizations of Moldea's book were sufficiently factual that a jury could
determine their truth or falsity. The court therefore found summary judgment to
be inappropriate and remanded the case for trial. The Times filed a motion for
rehearing, which the court of appeals granted.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
The issue before the Court of Appeals on rehearing of the court's opinion in
Moldea (I) was whether Moldea could in fact state a claim for defamation. A
statement is defamatory under District of Columbia law "if it tends to injure
plaintiff in his trade, profession, or community standing, or lower him in the esti-
mation of the community."3 The threshold inquiry in a defamation action is
whether a statement is "capable of conveying a defamatory meaning."4 If a
statement is reasonably capable of a defamatory meaning, then the trier of fact
must determine if it "was actually understood by the recipient in that sense."' In
Moldea (I), the appellate court found that Times' allegations that Moldea is a
"sloppy" journalist and that his book contains incorrect or misleading portrayals
of events satisfied this initial inquiry.
Although most courts formerly found assertions of "opinion" to be non-
actionable, the United States Supreme Court recently adopted an analysis that
recognizes statements of opinion can be actionable if they imply defamatory or
provably false facts.6 A speaker cannot shield himself from liability by simply
prefacing otherwise defamatory statements with the words "In my opinion... "
As a result, the appropriate inquiry is no longer merely whether a challenged
statement is "fact" or "opinion," but instead whether a statement is sufficiently
verifiable-i.e., whether a plaintiff can prove that a statement is false.
The court in Moldea (I) erred by relying upon a standard which ignored the
fact that the statements at issue were solely evaluations of a literary work that
appeared in the context of a book review. In its amended decision, the court
stated that while there is no "per se" exemption from defamation for book re-
views, the genre is one in which readers expect to find both favorable and unfa-
vorable critiques of literary works, reflecting the reviewer's assessment of an
author's work that is capable of a number of possible rational interpretations.
The court found that the challenged statements were Eskenazi's assessments of
Moldea's book, rather than assessments of Moldea himself. Although a critic's
latitude is not unlimited, he or she must be given the "breathing space" appropri-
3. Moldea (I), 15 F.3d at 1142 (citing Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 654
(D.C. Cir. 1966)).
4. Id. at 1142 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 614(1) (1977)).
5. Id. at 1142 (citing White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 519 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
6. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
[Vol. V:231
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ate to the genre.7
The court in Moldea (II) next articulated a "supportable interpretation" stan-
dard for evaluating critical reviews, providing that a critic's interpretation of a
literary work must be rationally supportable by reference to the actual text of the
written work. Such an analysis makes actionable only those reviews in which the
critic is unable to support his or her interpretations by reference to the text eval-
uated. In situations where a reviewer, instead of evaluating the book, directly
attacks a writer's character, reputation, or competence, the critical statements
remain potentially actionable.
In applying the "supportable interpretation" standard to the Times' review, the
court found it unnecessary to determine the verifiability of the assertion "too
much sloppy journalism," since statements contained in the review that support
such a conclusion are supportable interpretations of Moldea's book. The court
ruled that as a matter of law, the proper analysis of the challenged statements'
verifiability was whether no reasonable person could find that the review's char-
acterizations were supportable interpretations of Moldea's book. In applying this
standard, the court held that the Times' review was not defamatory.
Alternatively, the court considered whether the Times could escape potential
liability based upon the defense of "substantial truth." The court noted that most
of the factual evidence upon which the Times relied in making its "sloppy jour-
nalism" assertion could not be proven false at trial. "Substantial truth" is general-
ly regarded as a defense to defamation! Although the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit has rejected the so-called "incremental harm rule," the court ruled that the
"substantial truth" test still applied to the instant case. The court further found
that because the reviewer justified his "sloppy journalism" assertion with true
statements, supportable interpretations or supported opinions, the review was
substantially true and therefore not actionable.
The court also addressed Moldea's false light invasion of privacy claim. The
court of appeals in Moldea (I) reversed the lower court's ruling that Moldea
could not state a claim for false light invasion of privacy because he failed to
allege the publication of "private information." The elements of false light inva-
sion of privacy are met if the defendant published untrue facts concerning the
plaintiff that placed him in a false light that would be highly offensive to a rea-
sonable person." Such a claim does not require the publication of private
facts." While false light claims are usually also actionable in defamation, a
plaintiff is limited to recovery on only one of the two claims arising from a
7. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964).
8. See Liberty Lobby v. Dow Jones & Co., 838 F.2d 1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
486 U.S. 825 (1988).
9. Moldea (1), 15 F.3d at 1149 (citing Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1568
(D.C. Cir. 1984)), vacated on other grounds, 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (rejecting notion that a false de-
famatory statement cannot be actionable if made among other true statements because it does only
"incremental harm" to a plaintiff's reputation).
10. Moldea (I), 15 F.3d at 1151 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977)).
11. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E, cmL a).
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single publication. 2 The appellate court noted that a plaintiff could not resort to
a claim of false light invasion of privacy merely to avoid the burden of proof
required to establish defamation. 3 The court in Moldea (II) found that because
the Times was entitled to summary judgment on the defamation claim, Moldea's
false light invasion of privacy claim must also be rejected.
CONCLUSION
In summary, statements of opinion can be defamatory if they imply a prov-
ably false fact. However, in the context of a book review, challenged statements
are actionable in defamation only when the reviewer's interpretations are insup-
portable by reference to the text of the work being reviewed. Because the asser-
tion of "sloppy journalism" contained in the Times' review was supportable by
reference to specific passages in Moldea's book, the court rejected Moldea's libel
and invasion of privacy claims. The court of appeals therefore modified its prior
opinion, and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
the Times.
Radoje A. Vujovic
12. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E, cmt. b).
13. Moldea (I), 15 F.3d at 1151 (citing Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 671 (1991));
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
[Vol. V:231
4
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 17
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol5/iss1/17
